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Abstract:	What	motivates	political	parties	in	the	legislative	arena?	Existing	legislative	bargaining	
models	stress	parties’	office	and	policy	motivations.	A	particularly	important	question	concerns	
how	 parties	 in	 coalition	 government	 agree	 the	 distribution	 of	 cabinet	 seats.	 We	 add	 to	 this	
portfolio	allocation	literature	by	suggesting	that	future	electoral	considerations	affect	bargaining	
over	the	allocation	of	cabinet	seats	in	multi-party	cabinets.	Some	parties	are	penalized	by	voters	
for	participating	in	government,	increase	the	attractiveness	of	staying	in	opposition.	This	“cost	of	
governing”	shifts	 their	 seat	 reservation	price–	 the	minimum	cabinet	seats	demanded	 in	 return	
for	 joining	the	coalition.	Results	of	a	randomized	survey	experiment	of	 Irish	 legislators	support	
our	expectation,	demonstrating	that	political	elites	are	sensitive	to	future	electoral	losses	when	
contemplating	 the	 distribution	 of	 cabinet	 seats.	 This	 research	 advances	 our	 understanding	 of	
how	parties’	behavior	between	elections	is	influenced	by	anticipation	of	voters’	reaction.		
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Because	many	parliamentary	elections	fail	to	produce	a	political	party	with	a	majority	of	seats	in	
the	 legislature,	 coalition	 (multi-party)	 governments	 are	 common.	Which	 parties	 coalesce,	 and	
why,	has	been	the	subject	of	significant	theoretical	and	empirical	research	(Golder	2015;	Laver	
and	 Schofield	 1990;	 Martin	 and	 Stevenson	 2001;	 Müller	 and	 Strøm	 2003).	 Central	 to	 this	
coalition	 formation	 literature	 is	 the	 fundamental	 question	 of	 what	 motivates	 parties	 in	 the	
legislative	 arena.	 Because	 the	 cabinet	 is	 at	 the	 apex	 of	 political	 power	 in	most	 parliamentary	
democracies,	the	partisan	distribution	of	cabinet	seats	(what	scholars	term	portfolio	allocation)	
is	 a	 topic	 of	 particular	 real-world	 significance.	 Reflecting	 the	 received	wisdom,	Morelli	 (1999,	
808)	 notes	 that	 “the	 desire	 to	 be	 in	 office	 as	 well	 as	 the	 desire	 to	 affect	 policy	 outcomes’	
constitute	parties’	motivations	in	the	portfolio	allocation	game.”	
We	 challenge	 this	 assumption	 by	 suggesting	 that	 some	 parties	 are	 likely	motivated	 by	
future	electoral	considerations	in	bargaining	over	the	distribution	of	cabinet	portfolios.	Decades	
of	 research	 on	 legislative	 behavior	 indicate	 that	 electoral	 considerations	 motivate	 legislators	
(Carey	2009;	Downs	1957;	 Fenno	1978;	Mayhew	1974;	 Strøm	1997)	 and	 the	parties	 to	which	
they	belong	(Downs	1957).	The	very	act	of	being	in	government	in	many	parliamentary	systems	
may	electorally	disadvantage	a	party	(Narud	and	Valen	2008).	Anticipation	of	such	electoral	costs	
has	consequences	for	a	party’s	willingness	to	enter	government	(Müller	and	Strøm	1999;	Strøm	
1984;	1990a;	1990b)	and	stay	 in	government	 (Lupia	and	Strøm	1995).	Electoral	considerations	
matter	 also,	 this	 paper	 suggest,	 for	 how	 parties	 calculate	 their	 utility	 in	 bargaining	 over	 the	
allocation	of	portfolios.	
Specifically,	the	suggestion	is	that	parties	that	expect	to	lose	votes	as	a	result	of	being	in	
government	will	demand	a	 larger	 share	of	cabinet	 seats	 in	exchanges	 for	 their	participation	 in	
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the	coalition.	In	other	words,	parties	susceptible	to	electoral	costs	from	joining	the	government	
have	a	higher	reservation	price	–	the	minimum	number	of	cabinet	seats	 the	party	demands	 in	
return	for	participating	in	the	coalition	–	compared	with	parties	who	do	not	suffer	electorally,	or	
suffer	 less,	 from	 participating	 in	 the	 coalition.	Variation	 in	 reservation	 prices	 arises	 because,	
though	largely	unnoticed	in	the	academic	literature	(but	see	further	Narud	and	Valen	2008),	not	
all	governing	parties	are	equally	susceptible	to	the	electoral	costs	of	governing.1	Consider	as	an	
example	the	2015	British	General	Election.	In	net	terms,	the	outgoing	two-party	coalition	lost	25	
parliamentary	 seats.	 But	 the	 cost	 of	 governing	 was	 not	 equally	 distributed.	 The	 Conservative	
Party	gained	24	seats.	In	contrast,	the	Liberal	Democrats	lost	49	of	their	57	parliamentary	seats.	
Such	 possible	 variation	 in	 electoral	 fortunes	 is	 something	 that	 parties	 likely	 consider	 when	
contemplating	joining	a	coalition	(à	la	Strøm	1984;	1990)	and,	we	suggest,	when	bargaining	over	
																																								 																				
1	 Research	 on	 the	 economic	 vote	 (the	 notion	 that	 positive	 national	 economic	 performance	
results	 in	 the	 incumbent	 government	 being	 re-elected,	while	 negative	 economic	 performance	
leads	 voters	 to	 vote	 against	 the	 incumbent	 government)	 has	 tended	 to	 look	 at	 the	 overall	
electoral	 fortunes	of	the	 incumbent	government	or	the	performance	of	the	party	of	the	prime	
minister.	 The	 clarity	 of	 responsibility	 literature	 (the	 economic	 vote	 is	 conditional	 on	 voters’	
ability	 to	 assign	 credit	 or	 blame	 given	 political	 institutions	 and	 context)	 views	 coalition	
government	as	an	obstacle	 to	accountability	because	voters	are	unable	 to	 reward	or	punish	a	
single	 party	 (Hobolt,	 Tilley,	 and	 Banducci	 2013;	 Powell	 and	Whitten	 1993).	 In	 this	 paper,	 we	
explore	the	bargaining	consequences	where	electoral	costs	arising	from	joining	the	coalition	are	
pooled	unequally	amongst	government	parties.	
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the	 distribution	 of	 office	 payoffs.2	 We	 expect	 that,	 in	 equilibrium,	 parties	 who	 anticipate	
electoral	losses	at	time	t+1	set	a	higher	reservation	price	in	terms	of	cabinet	seat	share	at	time	t.	
In	other	words,	would-be	coalition	parties	most	susceptible	to	electoral	 losses	demand	upfront	
compensation	in	the	form	of	extra	cabinet	seats,	in	return	for	agreeing	to	join	the	coalition.		
To	help	corroborate	the	idea	that	political	elites	consider	future	electoral	considerations	
when	 bargaining	 over	 the	 quantitative	 distribution	 of	 portfolios,	 we	 conduct	 a	 randomized	
survey	 experiment	 of	 Irish	 legislators.	 We	 modify	 the	 standard	 divide-the-dollar/portfolio	
allocation	game,	treating	some	survey	participants	to	information	on	electoral	consequences	of	
governing.	 To	 anticipate,	 the	 experimental	 evidence	 suggests	 that	 a	 party	 susceptible	 to	
electoral	costs	is	awarded	a	larger	share	of	cabinet	seats,	all	else	equal.	
The	novelty	of	this	paper	is	in	suggesting	a	link	between	electoral	costs	and	how	parties	
bargain	 over	 the	 quantitative	 allocation	 of	 cabinet	 seats.	 A	 number	 of	 consequences	 follow	
directly	from	the	insight.	First,	our	argument	has	consequences	for	the	more	general	question	of	
which	coalitions	form,	in	at	least	two	ways.	Coalition	government	formation	is	typically	modelled	
as	 a	multi-stage	 sequential	 game,	 beginning	 with	 the	 selection	 of	 a	 would-be	 prime	minister	
(formateur),	 leading	to	the	emergence	of	a	proto-coalition,	moving	to	bargaining	over	portfolio	
payoffs	 and	 culminating	 in	 the	 investiture	 of	 the	 government	 (Rasch	 et	 al.	 2015).	 However,	
because	electoral	considerations	may	create	reservation	prices	which	can	be	delivered	or	denied	
																																								 																				
2	Following	the	formation	of	the	first	post-WWII	coalition	Government	in	Britain,	support	for	the	
Liberal	 Democrats	 party	 dropped	 in	 the	 very	 first	 post-government	 formation	 opinion	 poll.	 In	
contrast,	Conservative	Party	support	remained	static	in	the	opinion	polls	(Whitaker	2011,	1164).	
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during	bargaining	over	portfolio	payoffs,	the	list	of	politically	feasible	coalitions	is	determined	in	
part	 by	 the	willingness	 of	 parties	 to	 deal	with	 electoral	 considerations	 during	 bargaining	 over	
portfolio	allocations.	Thus,	whereas	Strøm	(1984;	1990a)	sees	future	electoral	considerations	as	
influencing	whether	or	not	a	party	will	enter	government,	participation	in	the	coalition	may	be	
conditional	on	whether	a	party’s	fears	over	electoral	costs	can	be	overcome	with	the	offer	of	a	
greater	share	of	cabinet	seats.	To	use	the	parlance	of	Laver	and	Schofield	(1990)	the	questions	of	
“who	got	in”	and	“who	got	what”	may	not	be	as	inseparable	as	heretofore	thought	(see	further,	
Cutler	 et	 al.	 2016).	 In	 addition,	 our	 findings	might	 imply	 that	 formateur	 parties	may	 strive	 for	
coalitions	 with	 policy-seeking	 (rather	 then	 vote-seeking	 or	 office-seeking)	 parties,	 as	 these	
parties	need	not	seek	compensation	for	future	vote	losses.	
Second,	our	findings	highlight	the	fact	that	existing	models	of	bargaining	in	legislatures	in	
both	 parliamentary	 and	 presidential	 regimes	 are	 likely	 overly-static.	 Laver	 and	 Schofield’s	
observation	over	25	years	ago	 that	 coalition	 theory	 suffers	 from	the	 implicit	assumption	“that	
politicians	do	not	look	forward	to	the	next	general	election	when	they	bargain”	remains	largely	
true	 today.	 Because	 politics	 is	 fundamentally	 about	 who	 gets	 what,	 when	 and	 why	 (Lasswell	
1950),	 understanding	 policy	 choices	 and	 outcomes	 such	 as	 government	 formation	 and	
performance	requires	an	accurate	understanding	of	what	really	motivates	legislators	and	parties.	
Thus,	 a	 fuller	 understanding	 of	 politics	 requires	 us	 to	 better	 understand	 how	 vote-seeking	
models	of	legislative	behavior	interact	dynamically	with	policy-seeking	and	office-seeking	models	
of	party	behavior,	as	Müller	and	Strøm’s	(1999)	have	so	capably	suggested.	This	paper	advances	
our	understanding	of	how	parties’	behavior	between	elections	 is	 influenced	by	anticipation	of	
voters’	reaction.	
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Finally,	 our	 argument	 may	 help	 resolve	 the	 infamous	 “portfolio	 allocation	 paradox”	
(Warwick	 and	 Druckman	 2001;	 2006).	 Scholars	 have	 struggled	 to	 explain	 the	 gap	 between	
theoretical	 predictions	 from	 formal	 bargaining	models	 and	 real-world	patterns	of	 cabinet	 seat	
distribution.	As	Laver,	De	Marchi,	and	Mutlu	(2011,	288)	note,	“the	profession’s	canonical	theory	
of	bargaining	in	legislatures	is	contradicted	by	one	of	the	profession’s	strongest	and	most	robust	
empirical	 laws.”	 The	 paradox	 may	 exist	 because	 existing	 formal	 models	 exclude	 electoral	
considerations	 from	 bargaining	 over	 portfolio	 allocation.	 We	 are	 not	 aware	 of	 any	 study	 of	
quantitative	 portfolio	 distribution	 which	 includes	 potential	 future	 electoral	 costs	 as	 part	 of	 a	
party’s	 utility	 function.	 Electoral	 considerations,	 this	 paper	 suggests,	 should	 form	 part	 of	 any	
model	of	bargaining	in	legislatures,	likely	reducing	the	agenda-setting	power	of	the	formateur.		
	
Literature	Review	
Scholars	 have	 long	 debated	 exactly	 what	 it	 is	 that	 motivates	 political	 parties	 in	 the	 game	 of	
coalition	government	formation.	Policy,	office	and	electoral	motivations	serve	as	prominent,	and	
typically	competing,	foundational	assumptions	in	theories	of	coalition	politics	(Müller	and	Strøm	
1999).	Which	parties,	if	any,	coalesce,	and	how	cabinet	seats	are	distributed	between	parties	in	a	
coalition	 government	 is	 an	 important	 question	 and	 the	 subject	 of	 significant	 theoretical	 and	
empirical	 research.	After	all,	 cabinets	are	at	 the	apex	of	political	power	 in	most	parliamentary	
systems,	 with	 ministers	 typically	 enjoying	 considerable	 autonomy	 to	 design	 and	 implement	
policy	(Laver	and	Shepsle	1994;	Smith	and	Martin	2017).	
	 Gamson’s	 Law	 -	 the	 suggestion	 that	 each	 party	 receives	 “a	 share	 of	 the	 payoff	
proportional	 to	 the	amount	of	 resources	which	 they	contribute	 to	a	 coalition”	 (Gamson	1961,	
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376)	-	dominates	empirical	research	on	portfolio	allocations	coalition	government.	Browne	and	
Frendreis	(1980,	753)	note	that	“a	proportionality	rule	governs	all	aspects	of	coalition	payoffs”	
(see	 also	 Schofield	 and	 Laver	 1985,	 Warwick	 and	 Druckman	 2001).	 De	 Winter	 and	 Dumont	
(2006:	181)	write	of	an	“iron	law”	of	proportionality.	Cutler	et	al.	(2016,	32)	describe	Gamson’s	
Law	 as	 “a	 strong	 and	 non-trivial	 empirical	 regularity,”	 while	 a	 skeptical	 Indridason	 (2015)	
nonetheless	notes	a	“strong	positive	relationship	between	legislative	seat	and	portfolios	share.”3		
The	empirical	constancy	of	Gamson’s	Law	contrasts	sharply	with	predictions	from	game-
theoretic	 legislative	bargaining	models.	Building	on	Rubinstein’s	(1982)	alternating	offer	model,	
Baron	 and	 Ferejohn	 (1989)	 model	 the	 allocation	 of	 portfolios	 between	 parties	 in	 coalition	
government	with	a	clear	prediction:	The	formateur	party	will	receive	a	disproportionate	share	of	
cabinet	 seats.	 As	 defined	 by	 Müller	 and	 Strøm	 (2000,	 15)	 the	 formateur	 is	 “a	 bargaining	
coordinator	who	is	also	the	intended	prime	minister.”	Characterized	as	a	simple	divide-the-dollar	
game,	 with	 instant	 office	 payoffs	 as	 the	 prize	 to	 be	 distributed,	 Baron	 and	 Ferejohn	 (1989)	
conclude	 that	 the	 formateur’s	 proposer	 advantage	 allows	 her	 or	 her	 party	 retain	 a	
disproportionately	 large	 share	 of	 portfolios	 (see	 also	 Baron	 1991	 and	 Diermeier	 and	 Merlo	
2000).	 Aside	 from	 Ansolabehere	 et	 al.	 (2005),	 few	 scholars	 find	 any	 evidence	 of	 a	 formateur	
advantage	 in	 portfolio	 allocation	 (see,	 for	 example,	 Cutler	 et	 al.	 2016,	 Laver	 et	 al.	 2011,	 and	
Indridason	 2015).	 The	 divergence	 between	 the	 predictions	 from	 bargaining	 theory	 and	 the	
empirical	 regularity	 of	 Gamson’s	 Law	 leads	 Warwick	 and	 Druckman	 (2006)	 to	 speak	 of	 a	
“portfolio	allocation	paradox,”	and	Cutler	et	al.	(2016:	31)	to	note	the	“notorious	contradiction”	
																																								 																				
3	 Gamson’s	 Law	may	 also	 predict	 the	 distribution	 of	 cabinet	 seats	 between	 factions	 within	 a	
party	(Ceron	2014;	Mershon	2001).	
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between	 one	 of	 the	 most	 influential	 models	 in	 political	 science	 and	 real-world	 portfolio	
allocation.		
Responding	 to	 this	 contradiction,	 Cox	 and	 Carroll	 (2007)	 suggest	 that	 the	 presence	 of	
pre-electoral	 coalitions	 makes	 an	 ex	 ante	 commitment	 to	 proportionality	 rational.	 Verzichelli	
(2008)	considers	whether	the	concept	of	‘fairness’	–	similar	to	the	concept	of	distributive	justice	
in	 economic	 bargaining	 models	 -	 explains	 the	 pattern	 of	 proportionality.	 Bäck,	 Meier,	 and	
Persson	(2009:	11)	suggest	that	proportionality	is	a	“well-established	bargaining	convention	that	
helps	 actors	 selecting	 equilibria	 when	 forming	 governments.”	 Falco-Gimeno	 and	 Indridason	
(2013)	 suggest	 that	 proportionality	 helps	 simplify	 complex	 and	uncertain	bargaining	 situations	
involving	policy	and	office	considerations.	Falcó-Gimeno	(2011)	argues	that	parties	deprived	of	
ministerial	office	for	a	long	time	will	be	impatient	to	enter	government,	reducing	their	demand	
for	portfolios	in	return	for	participation	in	government.	Bassi	(2013)	suggests	that	any	formateur	
advantage	disappears	when	the	formateur	is	determined	endogeneously.		
Any	attempt	 to	explain	 the	 logic	of	portfolio	 allocation	must	 contend	with	 yet	 another	
common	observation:	smaller	coalition	parties	tend,	if	anything,	to	be	overpaid	in	their	portfolio	
shares	 (Browne	 and	 Franklin	 1973;	Morelli	 1999,	 810).	 Indridason	 (2015)	 finds	 that	 this	 small	
party	advantage	 is	present	 in	every	country	 included	 in	his	 sample	 (see	also	Back	et	al.	2009).	
Focusing	 on	 trying	 to	 explain	 this	 party-size	 paradox,	 Indridason	 (2015)	 suggest	 that	 the	
formateur	 will	 over-compensate	 the	 minor	 coalition	 partner,	 thus	 ensuring	 loyalty	 to	 that	
coalition.	 Golder	 and	 Thomas	 (2014)	 suggest	 that	 the	 presence	 of	 a	 vote	 of	 no-confidence	
explains	 small-party	 overpayment	 because	 the	 threat	 of	 no-confidence	 provides	 “an	 incentive	
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for	 large	 formateur	parties	 to	overcompensate	smaller	coalition	partners	 in	exchange	 for	 their	
sustained	support	over	time”	(Golder	and	Thomas	2014,	1).		
In	 the	midst	 of	 the	mismatch	 between	 theory	 and	 empirical	 observations,	 Laver	 et	 al.	
(2011,	 296)	 call	 for	 a	 “fundamental	 reconsideration	 of	 how	 to	 model	 bargaining	 over	
government	 formation,”	 while	 Indridason	 (2015,10)	 warns	 that	 “the	 perceived	 robustness	 of	
Gamson’s	 Law	appears	 to	have	discouraged	efforts	 to	 consider	whether	portfolio	 allocation	 is	
influenced	by	other	factors.”	We	respond	to	the	challenge	by	suggesting	the	need	to	incorporate	
a	 previously	 unexplored	 variable	 into	 parties’	 utility	 function	 when	 bargaining	 over	 the	
quantitative	allocation	of	cabinet	portfolios:	the	fact	that	joining	the	coalition	may	come	with	a	
(relatively	 greater)	 electoral	 cost	 for	 some	 coalition	 parties.	 The	 lack	 of	 attention	 to	 electoral	
motivations	may	help	explain	the	contradiction	between	(office-	and	policy-focused)	bargaining	
theories	and	portfolio	allocations	within	real-world	coalitions.		
	
Electoral	Costs	and	Cabinet	Seats	
In	this	section	we	aim	to	explain	how	future	electoral	considerations	impact	bargaining	over	the	
quantitative	allocation	of	cabinet	seats.	We	begin	by	depicting	a	simple	divide-the-dollar	game	
where	 two	 parties,	 negotiating	 to	 form	 a	 coalition	 government,	 are	 entering	 the	 bargaining	
process	 for	 the	allocation	of	 cabinet	 seats.	The	proposer	 (or	 formateur)	party	 is	denoted	by	𝐹	
and	the	proposed-to	party	is	denoted	by	𝑃.	Let	the	total	number	of	legislators	be	denoted	by	𝐿,	
and	𝑙% 	and	𝑙&	denote	the	numerical	strength	of	each	of	the	two	parties	in	the	legislature.	For	the	
coalition	to	be	able	to	form	a	government,	it	has	to	be	that	𝑙% + 𝑙& > )*	(on	the	assumption	that	
any	 government	 must	 survive	 a	 parliamentary	 investiture	 or	 confidence	 vote).	 Parties	 are	
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assumed	 to	have	 two	 fundamental	motivations:	 (i)	 securing	as	many	 cabinet	 seats	 as	possible	
and	(ii)	with	an	eye	to	the	future,	winning	votes	at	the	next	election.4	As	is	standard	in	legislative	
bargaining	models,	each	party	𝑖 ∈ 𝐹, 𝑃 	discounts	the	future	by	a	factor	𝛿/.	The	utility	function	
of	party	𝑖,	then,	is		 𝑈/ 𝑥, 𝑦 = 𝑢/ 𝑥 + 𝛿/𝑉/(𝑦)	
	
where	𝑥	is	the	number	of	cabinet	seats	the	party	is	allocated	in	the	coalition	government	and	𝑦	
is	the	number	of	votes	the	party	expects	to	win	at	the	next	election.		
	 Party	𝑖	must	choose	to	join	the	coalition	government	or	not.	It	also	expects	its	number	
of	votes	at	the	next	election	to	change	(increase	or	decrease)	by	an	amount	𝛥𝑣/ 	if	it	participates	
in	government.	Let	𝑔/ 	denote	the	party's	decision	to	join	the	government	or	not	(𝑔/ = 1	if	it	joins	
the	government	and	𝑔/ = 0	if	it	does	not	become	a	member	of	the	coalition)	and	𝑣/ 	denote	the	
number	of	votes	the	party	expects	to	get	at	the	next	election	if	 it	does	not	enter	the	coalition.	
Then	the	number	of	votes	party	𝑖	expects	to	receive	at	the	next	election	depends	on	𝑔/ 	and	is	
given	by	
	
																																								 																				
4	We	follow	the	convention	in	coalition	studies	by	treating	policy	as	a	payoff	of	office.	As	Müller	
and	Strøm	(1999,	8)	note,	“policy	pursuit	is	typically	presented	as	a	supplement	to,	rather	than	a	
substitute	for,	office	seeking.”	Our	focus	here	and	throughout	this	paper	 is	on	the	quantitative	
distribution	of	cabinet	seats.	We	do	not	consider	qualitative	 issues,	such	as	the	fact	that	some	
parties	may	be	particular	 keen	 to	 secure	 certain	portfolios,	 such	 as	 a	 green	party	 seeking	 the	
environment	portfolio.	
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𝑣/ 𝑔/ = 𝑣/ if	𝑔/ = 0𝑣/ − 𝛥𝑣/ if	𝑔/ = 1.	
	
Of	 course,	 if	 𝑔/ = 0,	 the	 number	 of	 cabinet	 seats	 the	 party	 will	 get	 is	 𝑥 = 0	 (government	
membership	being	defined	as	the	party	holding	at	least	one	cabinet	seat).		
	
Party	𝑖	prefers	to	be	in	the	government	if		
	 𝑢/ 𝑠/ + 𝛿/𝑉/ 𝑣/ − 𝛥𝑣/ > 𝛿/𝑉/(𝑣/)	
	
	
The	above	condition	implicitly	defines	a	threshold	number	of	cabinet	seats	𝑠/∗	below	which	party	𝑖	would	prefer	to	stay	out	of	the	coalition	government.	The	condition	that	gives	this	threshold,	or	
what	we	refer	to	as	the	seat	reservation	price,	is	
	 𝑠/∗ = 𝑢/CD 𝛿/ 𝑉/ 𝑣/ − 𝑉/ 𝑣/ − 𝛥𝑣/ 	
	
where	𝑢/CD	is	the	inverse	function	of	𝑢.	
	 From	the	above	equation,	we	can	observe	 that	 the	reservation	price	𝑠/∗	 increases	 for	
party	 𝑖	 as	 the	 number	 votes	 that	 it	 expects	 to	 lose	 at	 the	 next	 election	 𝛥𝑣/ 	 increases.5	
Accounting	 for	 electoral	 considerations	 in	 a	 party’s	 utility	 function	 demonstrate	 that	 a	 higher	
incentive	s*	 is	 required	to	enter	 the	coalition	 for	 those	parties	 that	value	electoral	 results	and	
who	 may	 be	 electorally	 disadvantaged	 by	 joining	 the	 coalition.	 Given	 the	 proximate	 goal	 of	
winning	 cabinet	 seats	 during	 the	 portfolio	 allocation	 stage	 of	 government	 formation,	 the	
																																								 																				
5	Note	 that	Δvi	 need	not	 refer	 to	 losses	 but	 to	 the	 expected	 variation	of	 votes,	which	 can	be	
negative	or	positive.	
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allocation	 of	 cabinet	 seats	 seems	 the	 ideal	 currency	 to	 incentivize	 overcoming	 such	 electoral	
fears.6	 A	 “cost	 of	 governing”	 has	 the	 effect	 of	 shifting	 a	 party’s	 seat	 reservation	 price–	 the	
minimum	cabinet	seats	demanded	in	return	for	participate	in	the	coalition.	
	 Our	suggestion	that	parties	seek	to	compensate	future	electoral	losses	by	seeking	more	
cabinet	seats	at	 the	coalition	 formation	stage	relies	a	number	of	 fundamental	assumptions:	 (i)	
parties	 can	 anticipate	whether	 joining	 a	 coalition	will	 have	 electoral	 costs	 for	 them,	 (ii)	 these	
electoral	costs	may	differ	from	party	to	party,	(iii)	a	greater	share	of	cabinet	seats	does	not	have	
the	 effect	 of	 also	 increasing	 a	 party’s	 electoral	 losses,	 and	 (iv)	 parties	 value	 cabinet	 seats.	 As	
many	 of	 these	 issues	 have	 not	 been	 considered	 heretofore	 in	 the	 quantitative	 portfolio	
allocation	literature,	we	discuss	the	validity	of	each	in	turn.	
	 We	make	a	strong	assumption	concerning	parties'	ability	 to	gauge	the	 likely	electoral	
effect	of	government	participation.	Even	 if	parties	negotiating	over	government	 formation	are	
concerned	 about	 future	 electoral	 costs,	 are	 they	 able	 to	 anticipate	 the	 electoral	 costs	 of	
governing,	foreseeing,	with	sufficient	confidence,	their	electoral	fates	perhaps	years	in	advance?	
Other	scholars	certainly	believe	so.	For	example,	in	a	ground-breaking	contribution	to	the	study	
of	 party	 behavior,	 Strøm	 (1984;	 1990a;	 1990b)	 suggests	 that	 foreseeing	 the	 electoral	 cost	 of	
governing	 cause	 some	 parties	 to	 abstain	 from	 participating	 in	 government.	 Parties	 may	 face	
																																								 																				
6	We	assume,	as	discussed	below,	that	membership	of	 the	government	may	result	 in	electoral	
costs	but	that	electoral	costs	do	not	increase	with	the	number	of	cabinet	seats	held	by	the	party.	
We	also	assume	that	parties	care	equally	about	electoral	losses	while	acknowledging	that	in	the	
real	world,	the	same	electoral	loss	from	government	participation	can	be	more	or	less	costly	to	a	
party	depending	on	how	much	a	party	is	policy-oriented	or	vote-oriented.	
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making	a	hard	choice	between	participating	in	government	and	losing	votes	at	the	next	election	
(Müller	 and	 Strøm	 1999).	 As	 noted	 earlier,	 a	 party’s	 mere	 presence	 in	 government	 may	 be	
sufficient	for	it	to	lose	votes	at	the	next	general	election.	Governing	may	be	unpopular	and	not	
all	governments	are	capable	of	manipulating	the	economy	in	such	a	way	as	to	help	overcome	the	
challenges	 of	 being	 responsible	 for	 shaping	 and	 implementing	 public	 policy.	 As	 Cheibub	 and	
Przeworski	(1999,	225)	note,	“accountability	is	a	retrospective	mechanism,	in	that	sense	that	the	
actions	of	rulers	are	judged	ex	post	by	the	effects	they	have.”	Exploring	national	election	results	
17	 European	 countries	 between	 1945	 and	 1999,	 Narud	 and	 Valen	 (2008,	 379)	 find	 that	
incumbent	parties	 lost,	on	average,	2.59	percent	of	the	vote,	with	the	mean	loss	rising	to	6.28	
percent	of	the	vote	 in	the	1990s.	Moreover,	government	 incumbency	may	be	detrimental	to	a	
party’s	 performance	 at	 sub-national	 elections.	 The	 trade-off	 between	 (current)	 office	 and	
(future)	 votes	 causes	 some	 political	 parties	 to	 forgo	 office	 and	 policy	 for	 the	 “delayed	
gratification”	of	winning	votes	at	the	next	election.		
	 How	parties	evaluate	future	electoral	losses	has	real-world	consequences.	For	example,	
the	leadership	of	the	Irish	Labour	Party	has	often	found	it	difficult	to	convince	its	 legislators	to	
enter	coalition	specifically	because	the	 latter	readily	anticipate	the	electoral	costs	of	governing	
(The	 Irish	 Times,	 April	 16,	 2016).	 Following	 the	 2016	 election,	 the	 party	 leadership	wanted	 to	
participate	 in	 a	 coalition	 government	 but	 withdrew	 from	 negotiations	 after	 the	 leadership	
realized	 that	 it	 would	 be	 unlikely	 to	 secure	 support	 from	 a	 party	 conference	 (O’Malley	 2016,	
265).	Indeed,	the	Irish	Labour	party	has	often	explicitly	promised	voters	that	it	would	not	enter	
government,	 in	 an	attempt	 to	undo	 the	electoral	 slump	caused	 them	by	being	 in	 government	
(Laver	and	Schofield	1990,	2).	
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	 This	 office	 shyness	 (Strøm	 1990b,	 568)	 helps	 explain	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 minority	
governments	in	parliamentary	democracies.	As	(Müller	and	Strøm	1999,	9)	note,	“participating	in	
a	 cabinet	 coalition	 may	 be	 likely	 to	 carry	 a	 price	 in	 future	 elections,	 so	 that	 the	 trade-off	 is	
between	office	 and	 future	 electoral	 performance”	 (see	 also	Mattila	 and	Raunio	 2004).	 Parties	
are	said	also	 to	 think	about	electoral	considerations	when	 fixing	 the	 timing	of	an	election	 (the	
political	 business	 cycle	 literature)	 and/or	 when	 leaving	 a	 coalition.	 As	 Grofman	 and	 van	
Roozendaal	(1994,	158)	note,	“parties	terminate	a	cabinet	when	they	expect	electoral	gain.”	7		In	
short,	 the	 suggestion	 that	 parties	 can	 anticipate	 the	 electoral	 consequences	 of	 entering,	 and	
leaving,	 a	 coalition	 is	 a	 well-established	 assumption	 in	 comparative	 politics,	 and	 one	 that	
resonates	with	party	leaders	contemplating	such	decisions.	8			
																																								 																				
7	 Exploring	 the	 causes	 of	 coalition	 termination,	 Lupia	 and	 Strøm	 (1995)	 argue	 that	 positive	
electoral	 expectations	 actually	 enhance	 bargaining	 power.	 Rejecting	 the	 conventional	 wisdom	
that	electorally	popular	incumbent	parties	desire	to	call	an	election,	they	argue	that	(p.	655)	“a	
party	with	favourable	electoral	prospects	will	also	consider	the	option	of	extracting	advantages	
through	non-electoral	means	(e.g.,	bargaining	with	parties	that	have	less	favourable	prospects).”	
Thus,	the	prospects	of	electoral	gain	cause	a	party	to	reopen	bargaining	during	the	lifetime	of	a	
coalition.	Although	 their	 argument	appears	opposite	 to	 this	paper’s	 argument,	 the	 logic	 is	not	
contradictory	given	 their	 focus	on	 incumbent	governing	parties’	behaviour	 related	 to	breaking	
the	coalition	once,	in	effect,	electoral	costs	have	been	awarded.	
8	 Moreover,	 the	 politicians	 who	 form	 a	 critical	 component	 of	 any	 political	 party	 are	 highly	
sensitive	 to	 re-election	 concerns	 and	 what	 it	 takes	 to	 get	 re-elected,	 as	 a	 well-developed	
literature	in	legislative	studies	attests	to	(for	an	overview	see	Andre	et	al.	2014).	
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But	 do	 electoral	 considerations	 differ	 fundamentally	 from	 party	 to	 party,	 creating	 the	
variation	 in	 parties’	 reservation	 price	 for	 participating	 in	 government?	 While	 much	 of	 the	
literature	 on	 incumbents’	 electoral	 performance	 explores	 the	 collective	 electoral	 fate	 of	
governments	 -	 treating	 the	government	as	a	 single	entity,	 -	 the	potential	 for	 individual	parties	
within	 a	 coalition	 government	 to	 achieve	 different	 electoral	 fates	 exists.	 	 Indeed,	 vote	 swings	
between	governing	parties	from	election	to	election	may	partially	mask	the	true	electoral	cost	of	
governing	 (by	 which	 we	 mean	 the	 net	 vote	 loss	 for	 a	 party	 as	 a	 direct	 result	 of	 being	 in	
government	 rather	 than	 opposition).	 Looking	 at	 the	 electoral	 performance	 of	 government	
coalitions,	Rose	and	Mackie	 (1983)	 find	 that	 in	64	percent	of	 cases	one	coalition	party	gained	
votes	while	 another	 lost	 votes,	 noting	 further	 that	 “in	 nearly	 every	 country,	 jostling	 between	
coalition	partners	results	in	very	little	change	in	the	collective	vote	for	the	government:	it	simply	
results	in	a	redistribution	of	votes	between	coalition	partners”	(Rose	and	Mackie	1983,	127).		
Although	 beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 paper,	 it	 is	 interesting	 to	 think	 about	 why	 some	
coalition	 parties	might	 be	 punished	more	 harshly	 by	 voters	 for	 entering	 cabinet	 coalitions.	 A	
cause	could	be	the	policy	compromises	that	the	respective	party	is	forced	to	accept	(as,	possibly	
was	 the	 case	 for	 the	UK’s	 Liberal	 Democrats	 during	 the	 2010-15	 coalition	 government	where	
their	‘u-turn’	on	University	tuition	fees	angered	many	of	their	historical	support-base).	Another	
possible	 situation	 could	 be	 that	 the	 party	 reneges	 on	 a	 previous	 negative	 coalition	 signal	 and	
enters	a	coalition	with	the	party	their	voters	dislike	the	most	(as	possibly	was	the	example	with	
the	Irish	Labour	Party	enter	coalition	with	the	much-reviled	Fianna	Fáil	in	1993,	only	to	quit	the	
government	and	coalesce	with	more	common	bedfellows	a	year	 later).	As	a	former	Irish	prime	
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minister	 (Taoiseach)	writing	 about	 his	 personal	 experience	 of	 leading	 a	 coalition	 governments	
notes:		
The	relationship	between	a	bigger	and	a	smaller	party	in	a	coalition	is	a	sensitive	
one	because	experience	 in	 Ireland	has	been	 that	 the	 smaller	party	 tends	 to	get	
more	of	the	blame,	and	the	bigger	party	more	of	the	credit,	for	what	the	coalition	
does	 in	government.	Thus	the	smaller	party	runs	the	risk	of	doing	relatively	 less	
well	in	the	subsequent	election.9	
	 An	overview	of	governing	parties’	electoral	performance	in	Ireland	adds	credibility	to	the	
suggestion	 that	electoral	 costs	are	unequally	 shared,	 typically	at	a	 cost	 to	 the	 smaller	party	 in	
government.	 To	 see	 if	 politicians	 may	 form	 (reasonable)	 expectations	 about	 whether	 or	 not	
joining	the	coalition	will	have	electoral	costs,	Table	1	reports	percentage	seat	changes	for	parties	
with	experience	of	re-election	following	government	in	Ireland	from	1980	onwards.	
	
Table	1:	Electoral	Performance	(percentage	Seat	Change)	of	Key	Parties,	Ireland	1980-2016	
Time	Period	
	
Government	
FF	Seat	
Change	
FG	Seat	
Change	
Lab	Seat	
Change	
Green	Seat	
Change	
PD	Seat	
Change	
2011-2016	 FG-Labour	 109.5	 -24.2	 -78.78	 200	 n/a	
2007-2011	 FF-Green-PD	 -71.8	 49	 85	 -100	 n/a	
2002-2007	 FF-PD	 -1.9	 59.4	 -4.8	 0	 -75	
1997-2002	 FF-PD	 10.9	 -42.6	 -4.8	 200	 100	
1994-1997	 FG–Labour–DL	 14.9	 14.9	 -46.8	 100	 -55.5	
1992-1994	 FF-Labour	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	
1989-1992	 FF-PD	 -11.7	 -18.2	 120	 0	 66.7	
1987-1989	 FF	 -4.9	 8	 25	 100	 -57.14	
1982-1987	 FG-Labour	 13.3	 -27.1	 -25	 n/a	 n/a	
																																								 																				
9	 http://	 johnbruton.com/coalition-experience-in-ireland-what-works.	 Last	 accessed	 29	 March	
2017.		
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1982-1982	 FF	 -7.4	 11.1	 6.7	 n/a	 n/a	
1981-1982	 FG-Labour	 5.1	 -3.1	 0	 n/a	 n/a	
	
Notes:	Seat	change	of	outgoing	governing	parties	in	bold.	The	Progressive	Democrats	(PD)	ceased	to	exist	as	a	party	
prior	 to	 the	2011	general	election.	Democratic	Left	 (DL)	merged	with	 the	Labour	Party	prior	 to	 the	1997	General	
Election.		
	
Only	once	have	all	parties	in	an	outgoing	coalition	gained	seats	(in	2002,	at	the	height	of	
Ireland’s	economic	expansion).	In	five	cases,	all	governing	parties	lost	seats	(Fianna	Fáil	also	lost	
as	 a	 single	party	 cabinet	 in	 1989	 and	November	1982).	 Yet,	 the	 level	 of	 losses	within	 these	5	
coalitions	were	not	shared	proportionately.	For	example,	in	the	2016	election,	Fine	Gael	lost	16	
of	 their	 76	 seats	 while	 Labour	 lost	 26	 of	 their	 33	 seats.	 And	 this	 pattern	 was	 arguably	
predictable:	The	previous	time	Fine	Gael	coalesced	with	Labour,	Fine	Gael	actually	gained	seats	
while	Labour	lost	half	of	their	parliamentary	seats.	Indeed	one	has	to	look	as	far	back	as	1982	to	
find	an	election	where	Labour	did	not	perform	worse	 in	 terms	of	parliamentary	seat	 loss	 than	
their	coalition	partner.	But	even	in	that	election,	Labour	suffered	a	vote	swing	against	the	party	
of	0.8%	(in	contrast,	Labour’s	coalition	partner	lost	two	seats	despite	a	swing	to	it	of	+	0.8%).	In	
other	words,	the	pattern	in	the	Irish	case	is	clear:	With	few	exceptions,	being	in	government	is	
particularly	challenging	electorally	for	specific	parties.		
Given	what	we	know	about	these	patterns	and	the	causes	of	incumbent	losses,	could	it	
be	 that	 obtaining	 more	 cabinet	 seats	 only	 exacerbates	 a	 party’s	 subsequent	 electoral	
performance?	We	don’t	believe	that	a	bigger	share	of	cabinet	seats	may	make	the	electoral	cost	
higher	 than	a	smaller	share.	 In	other	words,	 for	 those	parties	 for	whom	participation	 is	costly,	
participating	in	a	coalition	government	is	a		normal	good	rather	than	an	inferior	good,	given	their	
voters'	 preferences.	 In	 formal	 terms,	 Ui	 is	 a	 positive	 function	 of	 si.	 We	 suspect	 that	 what	 is	
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electorally	costly	is	mere	participation	(dichotomous)	and	not	greater	participation	(continuous).	
It	 is	 clear	 from	Table	1	 that	 it	 is	 the	 junior	coalition	partner	 (the	smaller	party	 in	government,	
holding	fewest	cabinet	seats)	which	suffers	most	electorally.	At	the	very	least,	the	electoral	costs	
of	governing	within	the	coalition	are	not	positively	correlated	with	the	number	of	cabinet	seats.	
Thus,	 we	 see	 no	 reason	 to	 suspect	 that	 a	 party,	 worried	 about	 electoral	 costs,	 would	 forego	
more	cabinet	seats	once	 it	agreed	to	be	part	of	the	coalition	(although	we	don’t	disagree	with	
Strøm	[1990]	that	a	party	may	decline	participation	altogether	to	avoid	electoral	costs).	Indeed,	
if	policy	compromise	is	the	reason	for	voter	dissatisfaction	with	a	given	party,	and	if	the	share	of	
portfolio	 allocation	 determines	 a	 party’s	 influence	 over	 policy,	 then	 a	 party	 can	minimize	 the	
electoral	costs	of	governing	by	maximizing	the	number	of	portfolios	held.	
Finally,	we	assume	that	legislators,	and	thus	the	parties	to	which	they	belong,	value	their	
party	 being	 rewarded	 more,	 rather	 than	 fewer,	 cabinet	 seats.	 We	 feel	 fairly	 confident	 in	
assuming	that	legislators	in	most	parliamentary	systems	have	some	career	ambition,	in	that	most	
backbenchers	would	like	to	be	ministers.	The	more	ministerial	posts	a	party	receives,	the	higher	
the	chances	of	any	single	 legislator	 from	that	party	willing	one	of	 these	prized	posts.	Why	are	
cabinet	 seats	 so	 prized?	 Ministerial	 office	 can	 be	 used	 by	 officeholders	 to	 influence	 policy.	
Ministerial	office	also	comes	with	a	number	of	perquisites,	such	as	increased	salary,	more	staff,	
and	 perhaps	 even	 personal	 fame.	 Ministerial	 office	 may	 even	 bring	 personal	 electoral	 gain	
(Martin	 2016).	 In	 short,	ministerial	 office	 is	 an	 attractive	 proposition	 for	most	 legislators	 and	
party	leaders	will	want	to	maximise	the	number	available	to	distribute	within	their	party.	
Our	core	suggestion	is	that	the	possibility	for	electoral	losses	to	be	unequally	distributed	
within	 the	 coalition	 has	 consequences	 for	 the	 amount	 of	 office	 payoffs	 a	 party	 demands	 in	
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return	for	agreeing	to	participate	in	the	coalition	government.	A	comparison	with	conventional	
perspectives	 on	 portfolio	 allocation	 clarifies	 the	 novelty	 of	 our	 thesis.	 Our	 argument	 departs	
from	Baron	and	Ferejohn	by	suggesting	a	cost	from	agreeing	the	bargain	for	some	of	the	parties.	
Existing	models	 take	 account	 of	 the	 cost	 of	 bargaining	 delays,	 but	 not	 the	 cost	 of	 bargaining	
success.10	 For	 some	 parties,	 taking	 a	 share	 of	 the	 pie	 may	 have	 medium-term	 negative	
consequences.	 Bargaining	 is	 impacted	 because	 each	 player	 must	 calculate	 a	 cost-benefit	
analysis,	with	 the	 cost	 (future	electoral	 considerations)	 varying	among	players.	 Similarly,	while	
Strøm	(1984;	1990a;	1990b)	alerts	us	to	the	importance	of	policy	and	electoral	considerations	in	
shaping	 parties’	 preferences	 over	 entering	 government,	 that	 decision	 is	 presented	 in	 binary	
terms:	a	party	decided	to	enter	government	or	not	to	enter	government	having	considered	the	
likely	 electoral	 costs	 of	 doing	 so	 (and	 the	potential	 to	 influence	policy	 from	 the	opposition).11	
Each	party	makes	a	 trade-off	between	 short-term	benefits	and	 long-term	costs,	with	behavior	
based	on	how	steeply	parties	discount	the	future.	For	us,	 the	costs	 identified	by	Strøm	can	be	
softened	 by	 compensation	 in	 the	 form	 of	 a	 greater	 share	 of	 cabinet	 seats.	 A	 party	 fearful	 of	
																																								 																				
10	 This	makes	 sense	 given	 that	 Baron	 and	 Ferejohn’s	 base	model	 focuses	 on	 the	 allocation	 of	
particularism	in	a	legislature.	For	each	player,	only	benefits	are	derived	from	receiving	a	slice	of	
that	pie.	This	is	not	the	case,	we	suggest,	for	political	parties	considering	whether	or	not	to	enter	
a	coalition	government.	
11	Parties	are	assumed	to	be	unitary	actors.	However,	as	Martin	(2016)	has	argued,	the	costs	and	
rewards	 of	 governing	 are	 not	 necessarily	 shared	 equally	 between	 legislators	within	 governing	
parties.	 Instead,	 perquisites	 of	 ministerial	 office	 may	 be	 used	 by	 ministers	 in	 preferential	
electoral	systems	to	insulate	themselves	electorally	from	any	voter	displeasure	with	the	party.	
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future	electoral	losses	may	nevertheless	choose	to	participate	in	government	if	the	rate	of	office	
payoffs	is	sufficiently	attractive.	
	
The	Experiment	
We	 conduct	 a	 randomized	 survey	 experiment	 to	 ascertain	 the	 impact	 of	 electoral	 costs	 on	
political	 elite’	 preferences	 over	 the	 quantitative	 distribution	 of	 cabinet	 portfolios.	 Political	
science	in	general,	and	legislative	studies	in	particular,	have	a	venerable	tradition	of	elite	survey	
research	 (Bailer	2014).	 Survey	experiments	 represent	an	 innovative	departure	 from	 traditional	
surveys	 in	 that	 the	 survey	 content	 is	 manipulated	 to	 “prime	 a	 particular	 thought	 or	 idea	 to	
determine	how	(or	whether)	the	priming	affects	an	opinion	or	attitude”	(Gaines,	Kuklinski,	and	
Quirk	2007,	4).	This	experimental	approach	allows	the	direct	effect	of	one	variable	(in	our	case	
electoral	costs	of	governing)	on	another	(in	our	case	preferences	over	the	distribution	of	cabinet	
seats)	to	be	isolated,	reducing	methodological	fears	of	confounding	factors	or	causal	complexity	
(Druckman	 et	 al.	 2011).12	 A	 survey	 experiment	 of	 bargaining	 in	 legislatures	 involving	 actual	
																																								 																				
12	Employing	observational	data	to	test	our	argument	creates	significant	 identification	issues	 in	
terms	 of	 causal	 inference.	 For	 instance,	 those	 circumstances	 in	 which	 "office-shy"	 parties	
eventually	 get	 in	 government	 might	 be	 situations	 in	 which,	 for	 whatever	 (non-)observable	
reason,	there	is	no	other	alternative	for	the	formateur	but	to	seek	the	support	of	these	parties.	
Then,	 the	 "office-shy"	 party,	 knowing	 that,	 may	 demand	 extra	 cabinet	 seats.	 In	 such	
circumstances,	the	bargaining	context	may	be	the	omitted	variable	actually	explaining	why	these	
parties	are	able	to	extract	more.	
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legislators	 should	 eliminate	 external	 validity	 problems	 associated	 with	 more	 conventional	
randomized	laboratory	experiments	on	portfolio	allocation	based	on	the	behavior	of	non-elites.	
Nevertheless,	the	traditions	of	elite	survey	research	and	experimental	research	have	been	slow	
to	synergize	 in	 legislative	studies	(important	exceptions	 include	Harden	2013	studying	US	state	
legislators	 and	 Findley	 et	 al.	 2017	 studying	 Ugandan	 legislators).	 A	 recent	 review	 of	 the	
experimental	 approach	 in	 legislative	 behavior	 notes	 the	 lack	 of	 legislative	 survey	 experiments	
and	 encourages	 survey	 scholars	 to	 “embed	 experiments	 into	 such	 surveys	 to	 explore	 how	
respondent	legislators	would	react	to	distinct	scenarios”	(Druckman	et	al.	2014,	207).		
Conducting	 what	 we	 believe	 to	 be	 one	 of	 the	 first	 survey	 experiments	 of	 national	
legislators	in	a	European	democracy,	we	surveyed	all	members	of	the	lower	chamber	of	the	Irish	
Parliament.13	Ireland	manifests	the	defining	characteristics	of	a	classic	parliamentary	democracy,	
with	 the	 cabinet	 coming	 from	and	 remaining	 responsible	 to	 parliament’s	 lower	 chamber	 (Dáil	
Éireann).	 The	 setting	 is	 a	 particularly	 obvious	 choice	 to	 study	 portfolio	 allocation	 because	
members	of	the	Dáil,	known	as	Teachta	Dala	(TDs),	vote	both	to	elect	the	head	of	government	
and	again	to	confirm	en	bloc	the	remaining	members	of	the	cabinet.	Due	to	the	general	absence	
of	 pre-electoral	 coalitions	 (Golder	 2006),	 bargaining	 over	 coalition	 formation	 is	 a	 real	 and	
significant	part	of	 Irish	political	 life	 (Laver	 and	Schofield	1990;	O’Malley	2016).	While	 the	 Irish	
party	system	lacks	the	ideological	divisions	associated	with	other	European	countries,	parties	do	
find	it	difficult	to	form	coalitions	with	each	other.	For	example,	neither	of	the	two	largest	parties	
have	 formed	 a	 coalition	 together	 and	 the	 Labour	 Party	 Constitution	makes	 agreeing	 to	 join	 a	
																																								 																				
13	While	 the	 lower	 chamber	comprised	166	members,	 at	 the	 time	of	 the	 survey	experiment	1	
seat	was	vacant.	
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coalition	challenging.14	 It	could	be	argued	that	Ireland	offers	an	appropriate	setting	for	a	“hard	
test”	of	the	theory.	Ireland	is	a	country	in	which	smaller	parties	typically	lose	disproportionately	
more	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 participating	 in	 government,	 when	 compared	 to	 larger	 parties.	
Knowledge	of	the	electoral	costs	of	governing	means	that	the	control	group	is	somewhat	“pre-
treated”	 and	 therefore	 make	 the	 estimates	 of	 the	 average	 treatment	 effect	 arguably	 rather	
conservative.15	
The	core	issue	addressed	in	the	survey	experiment	concerned	how	cabinet	seats	ought	to	
be	 allocated	 as	 part	 of	 government	 formation	 negotiations	 surrounding	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	
notional	two-party	coalition	government.	Notional	party	labels	(Party	A	and	party	B)	are	used	so	
as	 to	 reduce	 any	 contamination	 effect.	 As	 Gaines,	 Kuklinski,	 and	 Quirk	 (2007,	 14)	 argue,	 the	
likelihood	 of	 contamination	 in	 survey	 experiments	 from	 real-world	 experience	 is	 unavoidable,	
unless	the	topic	is	a	largely	irrelevant	one.	In	the	survey,	a	proto-coalition	is	described	as	having	
100	 seats	 in	 Dáil	 Éireann.	 Party	 A	 contributes	 80	 TDs	 and	 Party	 B	 contributes	 20	 TDs	 to	 the	
coalition.	 The	 cabinet	 was	 described	 as	 comprising	 10	 ministers	 –	 constitutionally,	 the	 Irish	
cabinet	consists	of	between	seven	and	 fifteen	members.	Survey	 respondents	were	 then	asked	
how	many	cabinet	 seats	Party	B	should	 receive,	with	 the	choice	 to	select	any	number	 ranging	
from	1	to	9	seats	(any	more	than	nine	would	result	in	a	single-party	cabinet),	as	depicted	in	the	
appendix	(the	full	survey	is	reproduced	in	the	supplemental	information).		
																																								 																				
14	 Under	 the	 Labour	 Party	 Constitution,	 the	 “approval	 of	 the	 Party	 Conference,	which	 can	 be	
given	only	on	foot	of	the	recommendation	of	the	Party	Leader,	is	required	for	the	Party’s	entry	
into	Government”	(Source:	https://www.labour.ie/party/constitution/).	
15	I	am	very	grateful	to	a	reviewer	for	alerting	me	to	this	point.	
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TDs	were	 assigned	 randomly	 to	 a	 treatment	 or	 control	 condition	 using	 a	within-group	
process.	 The	 treatment	 was	 designed	 to	 elicit	 whether	 electoral	 costs	 would	 affect	 the	
preferences	 of	 legislators	 over	 the	 distribution	 of	 cabinet	 seats.	 TDs	 in	 the	 treatment	 group	
received	 information	about	 the	 likely	electoral	costs	 to	Party	B	of	participating	 in	government.	
The	first	treatment	sub-group	were	informed	that	Party	B’s	participation	in	the	coalition	would	
result	in	5	of	the	20	TDs	from	Party	B	losing	their	seat.	Party	A,	in	contrast,	would	lose	no	or	few	
seats.	As	with	 the	control	 group,	 the	 treatment	group	was	 then	 invited	 to	allocate	between	1	
and	9	 cabinet	 seats	 to	Party	B.	 The	 second	 treatment	 sub-group	 received	 similar	 information,	
except	 this	 time	 the	predicted	 losses	of	Party	B	were	 increased	 from	5	 seats	 to	10	 seats.	This	
manipulation	of	the	treatment	was	designed	to	elicit	the	sensitivity	of	Irish	political	elites	to	the	
level	of	electoral	losses,	hopefully	allowing	inferences	to	be	drawn	concerning	the	magnitude	of	
trade-off	between	potential	legislative	seat	losses	and	cabinet	seats	offered.		
The	 names	 and	 contact	 details	 (email,	 postal	 address	 and	 telephone	 number)	 of	 TDs	
were	 obtained	 from	 the	 official	 parliamentary	 website.16	 Background	 and	 demographic	 data	
(party,	 gender,	 electoral	 record,	 past	 ministerial	 experience)	 is	 from	 Collins	 (2011)	 and	 the	
aforementioned	 parliament	 website.	 Low	 response	 rates	 constitute	 a	 real	 concern	 in	 elite	
surveys	 (Deschouwer	 and	 Depauw	 2014),	 and	 the	 current	 survey	 was	 designed	 to	 maximize	
response	rates.	Questions	were	kept	to	a	minimum,	with	the	cover	letter	noting	that	the	survey	
could	be	completed	in	1-2	minutes.	The	survey	experiment	was	conducted	in	three	stages.	In	the	
first	instance,	the	survey	was	distributed	electronically	via	the	Bristol	Online	Survey	platform.	A	
																																								 																				
16	http://www.oireachtas.ie/ViewDoc.asp?DocId=-1&CatID=138	
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week	later	a	reminder	email	was	send	to	non-respondents.	Five	days	later,	the	survey	was	sent	
via	 post	 to	 remaining	non-respondents.	 Two	weeks	 after	 that,	 non-respondents	were	 emailed	
and	encouraged	to	complete	the	survey.		
Of	the	165	parliamentarians	contacted,	34	online	surveys	were	completed.	An	additional	
32	parliamentarians	returned	the	paper	version	of	the	survey.	Of	the	latter,	one	is	excluded	from	
the	 analysis	 as	 the	 respondent	 removed	 the	 identifying	 information	 and	 a	 further	 two	 are	
excluded	 as	 the	 respondent	 did	 not	 answer	 the	 primary	 question.	 Thus,	 in	 total,	 63	 survey	
responses	were	 available	 for	 analysis,	 representing	 a	 response	 rate	 of	 38	 percent.	 As	 table	 2	
reports,	the	then	junior	governing	party	(Labour)	and	the	center-left	opposition	Fianna	Fáil	are	
over-represented	relative	to	other	groups.	Nevertheless,	responses	are	fairly	evenly	distributed	
by	group,	although	relatively	fewer	parliamentarians	in	treatment	group	one	responded.		
	
Table	2:	Survey	Responses	by	Party	and	Group	
Party	 Population	 Overall	Responses	 Control	
Group	
Treatment	
Group	1	
Treatment	
Group	2	
Fianna	Fáil	 19	 11	(57.9%)	 6	 3	 2	
Fine	Gael		 74	 22	(29.7%)	 6	 9	 7	
Labour	Party	 37	 21	(56.8%)	 8	 3	 10	
Other	 35	 9	(25.7%)	 3	 3	 3	
Total	 165	 63	(38.2%)	 23		 18	 22	
Note:	Percent	of	population	in	brackets	
	
The	results	of	the	experiment	provide	at	least	modest	evidence	that	real-world	legislators	
would	choose	to	allocate	disproportionately	more	cabinet	seats	to	a	party	who	expect	to	suffer	
electoral	 losses	 from	participating	 in	 the	coalition.	Figure	1	 reports	how	responding	 legislators	
would	allocate	cabinet	seats	under	three	alternative	conditions	prescribed	in	the	experiment.	A	
plurality	of	respondents	in	the	control	group	(65	percent)	would	allocate	3	seats	to	party	B,	with	
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all	remaining	respondents	allocating	seats	exactly	proportionately	to	the	legislative	seats	Party	B	
contributes	to	the	coalition.	No	legislator	in	the	control	group	suggested	allocating	more	than	4	
seats	 to	party	B.	On	average,	Party	B	would	be	awarded	2.65	seats	absent	any	 information	on	
electoral	 costs.	 Looking	 at	 the	 treatment	 groups,	 the	 treatment	 seems	 to	 have	 the	 effect	
predicted	 by	 our	 theory:	 introducing	 information	 on	 a	 party’s	 electoral	 cost	 increases,	 on	
average,	 the	 number	 of	 cabinet	 seats	 which	 a	 legislator	 is	 willing	 to	 allocate.	 Ten	 of	 the	 18	
responding	legislators	in	the	first	treatment	group	suggested	3	(n=7),	4(n=2)	or	5	(n=1)	seats.	On	
average,	legislators	in	this	treatment	group	would	allocate	2.78	cabinet	seats.	Strengthening	the	
treatment	 in	terms	of	the	degree	of	 likely	future	electoral	 losses	 increased	the	willingness	of	a	
legislator	 to	 over-allocate	 cabinet	 seats.	 The	 second	 treatment	 resulted	 in	 an	 average	 of	 3.18	
cabinet	seats	being	awarded.		
	
Figure	1:	Cabinet	Seats	Awarded,	by	Experimental	Group	
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Looking	at	the	overall	difference	between	the	control	group	and	treatment	groups,	 the	
difference	between	 the	 control	 group	and	 the	 treatment	group	equals	0.35.	 This	difference	 is	
statistically	 significant	 at	 the	 90%	 level.	 The	 one-tailed	 p-value	 for	 the	 alternative	 hypotheses	
(mean	difference	>	0)	equals	0.04.	The	p-value	is	less	than	0.05,	allowing	us	to	conclude	that	the	
mean	difference	is	statistically	significantly	greater	than	zero.	The	two-tailed	p-value	equals	0.08	
and	thus	we	can	conclude	that	 the	mean	value	of	cabinet	seats	 for	 the	control	and	treatment	
groups	is	statistically	significantly	different	from	zero.		
The	 differences	 between	 each	 group	 are	 somewhat	 more	 difficult	 to	 interpret.	
Comparing	only	the	control	group	and	weaker	of	the	treatment	groups,	a	difference	exists	in	the	
direction	 predicted	 by	 our	 theory,	 but	 this	 difference	 is	 not	 statistically	 significant	 at	 the	 95	
percent	 level.	 Again,	 in	 comparing	 the	 weaker	 treatment	 group	 with	 the	 stronger	 treatment	
group,	 the	 difference	 is	 in	 the	 direction	 predicted,	 but	 the	 difference	 again	 fails	 to	 reach	
conventional	levels	of	statistical	significance.	As	one	would	expect,	the	strongest	differences	are	
to	be	found	when	the	control	group	is	compared	to	the	second	(strongest)	treatment	group.	The	
magnitude	 of	 differences	 equals	 .53	 at	 95	 percent	 levels	 of	 confidence	 in	 a	 2-tailed	 t-test.	
Moreover,	 the	 one-tailed	 p-value	 for	 the	 alternative	 hypotheses	 (mean	difference	 >	 0)	 equals	
0.007.	One	possible	interpretation	of	these	results	is	that	the	level	of	likely	future	electoral	losses	
is	 an	 important	 factor.	 Disproportionately	 larger	 losses	 may	 result	 in	 exponentially	 larger	
compensation.	
Although	 the	 sample	 is	 fairly	 balanced	 (see	 Table	 2	 above),	 any	 bias	 in	 response	 rates	
may	introduce	a	worry	that	the	experiment	is	capturing	an	effect	other	than	the	treatment.	To	
control	for	the	possibility	that	party	affiliation	is	shaping	a	legislator’s	preference,	Table	3	reports	
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the	 results	 of	 a	 regression	 analysis,	 controlling	 for	 the	 respondent’s	 party	 and	 party	 size.	 The	
variable	Party	Size	equals	one	when	the	respondent	is	a	member	of	one	of	the	two	large	parties	
and	 zero	 otherwise.	 In	 all	 three	models,	 Treatment	 2	 (“if	 Party	 B	 enters	 the	 coalition,	 it	 can	
expect	significant	losses	at	the	next	general	election,	resulting	in	10	TDs	from	Party	B	losing	their	
seat”)	has	a	robust	positive	effect	on	Cabinet	Seats.	The	positive	effect	of	Treatment	2	is	robust	
to	 the	 inclusion	 of	 party	 size	 and	 party	 fixed	 effects.	 Although	 the	 estimated	 coefficient	 on	
Treatment	1	 (predicting	a	 loss	of	5	parliamentary	seats	at	 the	next	election)	 is	also	positive,	 it	
fails	to	reach	conventional	levels	of	statistical	significance.		
	
Table	3:	Impact	of	Party	on	Cabinet	Seat	Allocation	
		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	
	
Cabinet	
Seats	
Cabinet	
Seats	
Cabinet	
Seats	
		 		 		 		
Treatment	Group	1	 0.126	 0.230	 0.308	
	
(0.230)	 (0.203)	 (0.214)	
Treatment	Group	2	 0.530**	 0.449**	 0.478***	
	
(0.209)	 (0.174)	 (0.163)	
Party	Size	
	
-0.717***	
	
	 	
(0.158)	
	Fine	Gael	
	 	
-0.334	
	 	 	
(0.239)	
Labour	
	 	
0.644**	
	 	 	
(0.244)	
Other	
	 	
0.384*	
	 	 	
(0.226)	
Constant	 2.652***	 3.026***	 2.465***	
	
(0.102)	 (0.090)	 (0.191)	
	 	 	 	Observations	 63	 63	 63	
R-squared	 0.091	 0.301	 0.374	
	
Notes:	Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses;	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1.		
The	control	group	(Group	0)	is	the	base,	comparison	group.	Fianna	Fáil	is	the	base	comparison	party.		
	
	 27	
The	estimated	effect	of	party	size	is	negative	and	statistically	significant.	Members	of	big	parties	
demand	fewer	cabinet	seats	than	members	of	small	parties,	all	else	equal.	Controlling	for	party	
size,	 the	estimated	effect	of	Treatment	2	 remains	positive	and	statistically	 significant.	 In	other	
words,	Dáil	Deputies	treated	to	information	on	high	electoral	costs	allocate	more	cabinet	seats	
to	the	party	with	electoral	costs	whether	they	are	from	big	parties	or	small	parties.		
	 Column	 3	 of	 table	 3	 includes	 party	 fixed	 effects.	 The	 positive	 effect	 of	 Treatment	 2	
remains	 statistically	 significant	 with	 the	 inclusion	 of	 party	 fixed	 effects.	 Controlling	 for	 party,	
Treatment	 2	 increases	 the	 number	 of	 cabinet	 seats	 awarded.	 In	 other	 words,	 Dáil	 Deputies	
respond	similarly	to	Treatment	2,	regardless	of	party;	they	respond	by	increasing	the	number	of	
cabinet	 seats	awarded.	 In	Column	3	of	 table	3,	Fianna	Fáil	 is	 the	base	comparison	group.	The	
estimated	 coefficients	 on	 the	 party	 effects	must	 therefore	 be	 interpreted	with	 reference	 this	
comparison	 group	 (i.e.	 Fianna	 Fáil).	 No	 statistically	 significant	 difference	 exists	 between	 the	
number	of	cabinet	seats	awarded	by	parliamentarians	 from	the	centre-right	Fine	Gael	and	the	
centre-left	 Fianna	 Fáil.	 On	 average,	 Labour	 Party	 Dáil	 Deputies	 award	more	 cabinet	 seats,	 as	
compared	 to	 Fianna	 Fáil	 legislators.	 This	 is	 perhaps	 not	 surprising	 given	 that	 the	 Irish	 labour	
Party	 often	 suffers	 disproportionately	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 electoral	 cost	 of	 governing,	 as	 Table	 1	
illustrates.	Dáil	 Deputies	 from	other	 parliamentary	 groups	 also	 appear	 to	 award	more	 cabinet	
seats	than	Fianna	Fáil	parliamentarians,	however,	this	coefficient	is	statistically	significant	at	only	
the	90%	level.		
The	coefficients	and	standard	errors	for	both	treatments	are	displayed	visually	in	Figure	
2.	Treatment	2	significantly	increases	the	number	of	cabinet	seats	awarded	by	parliamentarians.	
Dáil	Deputies	 that	were	 surveyed	with	 treatment	2	 allocate	0.5	more	 cabinet	 seats	 than	 their	
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colleagues	 in	 the	 control	 group,	 on	 average	 (out	 of	 a	 total	 of	 10	 cabinet	 seats).	 This	 positive	
effects	 is	statistically	significant	at	the	95%	level.	Dáil	Deputies	that	receive	treatment	1	award	
more	 cabinet	 seats	 than	 TDs	 in	 the	 control	 group.	 However,	 the	 confident	 interval	 for	 this	
estimated	 effect	 includes	 zero.	 Therefore,	 we	 cannot	 conclude	 that	 there	 is	 a	 statistically	
significant	difference	between	the	control	group	and	treatment	group	1.		
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Figure	2:	Estimated	Effect	of	Treatment	on	Cabinet	Seats		
	
Notes:	Estimated	coefficients	from	Column	1	of	Table	3	with	95%	confident	intervals.		
	
	
Perhaps	one	of	the	most	puzzling	findings	from	the	elite	survey	experiment	is	that,	even	
without	a	treatment,	a	tendency	exists	to	over-allocate	seats	to	Party	B	as	the	results	from	the	
control	group	demonstrate	(Figure	1).	One	possible	reason	for	this	 is	the	nature	of	elite	versus	
non-elite	survey	experiments.	In	standard	laboratory	or	survey	experiments,	the	issue	of	external	
validity	 is	 cause	 for	 concern.	 As	 Barabas	 and	 Jerit	 (2010:	 228)	 note	 “the	 typical	 survey	
experiment	generates	effects	 likely	 to	be	observed	only	among	the	highly	attentive	 in	 the	real	
world.”	It	is	possible	that	experimental	surveys	of	elites	have	the	opposite	problem:	elites	in	the	
control	group	may	nevertheless	be	attuned	to	the	effect	postulated	by	the	treatment,	owing	to	
their	knowledge	of	real	world	politics.	Thus,	in	our	case,	politicians	even	without	being	prompted	
may	act	as	if	Party	B	would	be	likely	to	suffer	an	electoral	loss,	given	their	knowledge	of	electoral	
Treatment Group 1
Treatment Group 2
-.5 0 .5 1
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politics.	Ultimately,	we	can	take	comfort	from	the	fact	that	the	treatment	did	have	an	effect,	but	
the	 presence	 of	 disproportionality	 in	 the	 control	 group	 may	 be	 accounted	 for	 by	 external,	
possibly	tacit,	knowledge	which	social	science	experiments	are	often	unable	to	avoid.		
In	 the	 survey,	 respondents	 were	 asked	 if	 it	 is	 generally	 more	 or	 less	 difficult	 for	 an	
incumbent	 from	the	governing	parties	 to	gain	 re-election,	compared	to	an	 incumbent	 from	an	
opposition	party.	14	parliamentarians	indicated	that	re-election	as	a	government	incumbent	was	
much	more	 difficult,	 32	 said	 governing	made	 re-election	 somewhat	more	 difficult,	 6	 reported	
feeling	it	made	no	difference	and	10	said	that	being	a	government	parliamentarian	made	make	
re-election	somewhat	easier.	No	respondent	reported	feeling	that	being	a	Government	legislator	
make	re-election	much	easier.	The	results	indicate	a	mixed	opinion,	but	some	sensitivity	to	the	
electoral	costs	of	governing,	and	may	reflect	Martin’s	(2016)	argument	that	the	electoral	costs	of	
governing	 are	 unlikely	 to	 be	 equally	 shared	 within	 parties	 between	 backbenchers	 and	
frontbenchers.	
	
Conclusion	
Under	a	parliamentary	system	of	government,	the	cabinet	comes	from,	and	remains	responsible	
to,	 the	 legislature.	 Where	 no	 political	 party	 controls	 a	 majority	 of	 seats	 in	 the	 legislature,	
cabinets	comprising	two	or	more	political	parties	often	emerge.	Which	parties	coalesce	and	how	
the	 spoils	 of	 office	 -	 particularly	 cabinet	 seats	 -	 are	 distributed	 within	 the	 coalition	 has	 long	
fascinated	scholars	and	citizens	alike.	Existing	legislative	bargaining	models	stress	parties’	office	
and	policy	motivations.	
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Our	 core	 suggestion	 is	 that	 an	 understanding	 of	 parties’	 incentives	 in	 bargaining	 over	
portfolio	allocation	must	 include	recognition	of	 the	potential	unequal	electoral	costs	of	 joining	
the	coalition.	Some	parties	may	suffer	electorally	from	being	in	government,	some	significantly	
more	than	others.	This	paper	has	argued	that	the	prospect	of	future	electoral	costs	shapes	not	
only	the	decision	of	a	party	to	enter	or	not	to	enter	government.	Electoral	considerations	-	the	
prospect	of	 future	 losses	and	the	possibility	 for	these	 losses	to	be	unequally	distributed	within	
the	coalition	–	 impacts	a	party’s	reservation	price.	By	reservation	price	we	mean	the	minimum	
number	 of	 payoffs	 needed	 to	 secure	 a	 party’s	willingness	 to	 participate	 in	 government.	 Thus,	
future	 electoral	 considerations	 may	 shape	 the	 amount	 of	 office	 payoffs	 a	 party	 demands	 in	
return	 for	 agreeing	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 coalition	 government.	 In	 equilibrium,	 parties	 who	
anticipate	 electoral	 losses	 at	 time	 t+1	 demand	 compensation	 in	 the	 form	 of	 a	 greater	 than	
proportionate	share	of	office	(cabinet	portfolios)	at	time	t.	
To	empirically	assess	 this	argument,	we	conducted	a	 randomized	survey	experiment	of	
Irish	legislators.	The	results	of	the	experiment	provide	some	evidence	that	real-world	legislators	
choose	to	allocate	more	cabinet	seats	to	a	party	they	expect	to	suffer	disproportionate	electoral	
losses	 from	participating	 in	 the	 coalition.	 Providing	 respondents	with	 information	 on	 electoral	
costs	for	a	party	increased	the	number	of	cabinet	seats	a	legislator	was	willing	to	award	to	that	
party	in	return	for	joining	the	coalition.		
A	number	of	significant	implications	follow	from	our	findings.	Our	research	helps	bridge	
the	 artificial	 divide	 between	 legislative	 studies	 (which	 stresses	 re-election	 as	 political	 elites’	
primary	 goal)	 and	 scholarship	on	party	 politics	within	 the	 legislative	 arena,	which	has	 focused	
more	 on	 the	 search	 for	 government	 office	 and,	 through	 this,	 influence	 on	 public	 policy.	 Our	
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research	 illustrates	 how	 the	 anticipation	 of	 voters'	 reaction	 shapes	 parties'	 behavior	 in	 the	
legislative	arena	between	elections.		
Second,	our	argument	has	consequences	for	the	broader	question	of	who	gets	to	govern	
in	 parliamentary	 democracies	 without	 a	 majority	 party.	 Portfolio	 allocation	 is	 a	 significant	
component	of	the	government	formation	process,	even	if	it	has	tended	to	be	studied	in	isolation	
from	 the	 larger	 question	 of	 which	 parties	 choose	 to	 coalesce.	 The	willingness	 of	 a	 formateur	
party	to	compensate	for	electoral	costs,	and	the	willingness	of	an	electorally-vulnerable	party	to	
be	 compensated,	 likely	 shapes	 which	 government	 will	 form.	 Our	 perspective	 suggests	 that	
because	parties	take	future	electoral	gains	or	losses	into	account,	coalition	formation	should	not	
be	 viewed	 as	 a	 zero-sum	 game.	 If	 a	 formateur	 party	 can	 choose	 between	 different	 coalition	
partners	whose	 expectations	 of	 electoral	 costs	 differ,	 formateur	may	 be	more	 likely	 to	 select	
those	junior	parties	that	expect	to	be	punished	less	harshly.	In	other	words,	parties	with	higher	
reservation	 values	 owing	 to	 higher	 electoral	 costs	 of	 joining	 the	 coalition	make	 less	 attractive	
coalition	partners,	 all	 else	 equal.	 In	 this	 respect,	 our	model	 differs	 from	 the	 zero-sum	 logic	of	
most	 quantitative	 portfolio	 allocation	models.	 By	 extension,	 a	 formateur	 party	may	 strive	 for	
coalitions	with	policy-seeking	(rather	then	vote-	or	office-seeking)	parties	as	junior	partners	-	as	
these	parties	don't	need,	and	therefore	don’t	ask	for,	compensation	for	future	vote	losses.	The	
ability	 of	 coalition	 theories	 to	 predict	 real	 world	 coalitions	 remains	 very	 limited,	 and	 our	
argument	may	provide	valuable	new	insights	into	how	coalition	partners	choose	each	other.	
Finally,	our	argument	has	consequences	for	the	debate	on	the	portfolio	allocation	puzzle,	
and	 in	particular	 the	 fact	 that	smaller	parties,	 rather	 than	the	party	of	 the	 formateur,	 receives	
proportionately	more	cabinet	seats.	 It	has	been	suggested	that	small	parties	suffer	most	in	the	
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electoral	 arena	 from	 governing	 (although	 the	 comparative	 veracity	 of	 this	 statement	 needs	
further	empirical	investigation).	If	true,	then	the	cabinet	bonus	to	smaller	coalition	parties	could	
be	caused	by	attempts	to	compensate	electoral	costs.	The	broader	implication	is	that	parties	are	
indeed	strategic	in	their	portfolio	allocation	behavior.		
Yet,	 a	 number	 of	 puzzles	 remain.	 For	 example,	 even	 without	 electoral	 losses	 being	
revealed,	many	Irish	legislators	award	a	greater	than	proportional	number	of	cabinet	seats	to	the	
junior	 coalition	 party.	 It	 may	 be,	 for	 example,	 that	 legislator’	 perceptions	 regarding	 fairness	
shape	their	allocation	decision.	A	contamination	effects,	with	the	control	group	effectively	pre-
treated	 owing	 to	 their	 knowledge	 of	 electoral	 politics,	 may	 also	 explain	 the	 over-allocation.	
Second,	 we	 need	 to	 explore	 whether	 other	 mechanisms,	 such	 as	 policy	 compromise	 when	
bargaining	 over	 the	 coalition	 agreement,	 can	 be	 used	 to	 compensate	 electorally-vulnerable	
parties.	In	other	words,	the	bargain	to	compensate	future	electoral	losses	could	very	well	focus	
on	policy	rather	than	office.	After	all,	parties	will	want	to	maximize	the	proportion	of	their	party	
manifesto	which	gets	incorporated	into	the	coalition	agreement.	Compensation	could	also	focus	
on	the	allocation	of	other,	sub-cabinet	offices,	such	as	junior	ministers,	“mega-seats”	within	the	
legislature	(such	as	committee	chairs)	and	extra-legislative	office	prizes	(such	as	appointment	to	
state	 boards).	 Because	 individual	 cabinet	 ministers	 hold	 such	 significant	 agenda-setting	 and	
gatekeeping	 influence	 over	 their	 own	 portfolio,	 and	 because	ministerial	 office	 is	 so	 prized	 by	
legislators,	 we	 suspect	 that	 cabinet	 portfolios	 may	 be	 a	 preferred	 compensation	mechanism.	
Nevertheless,	 future	 research	 should	 explore	 all	 aspects	 of	 the	 coalition	 bargain	 from	 the	
perspective	of	our	compensating	votes	for	cabinet	seats	hypotheses.	Finally,	as	we	have	already	
begun	 to	 do,	 it	 is	 worth	 exploring	 our	 arguments’	 scope	 conditions	 through	 cross-national	
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empirical	 analysis.	We	would	 expect	 to	 find	 that	 political	 parties	 bargaining	 over	 government	
formation	and	portfolio	allocation	take	future	election	results	into	account,	but	that	this	pattern	
should	be	greatest	in	polities	with	“hyper	accountability,”	that	is	to	say,	much	harsher	electoral	
punishment	 for	 some	governing	parties.	 This	 paper,	we	hope	will	motivate	 further	 theoretical	
and	 empirical	 work	 to	 explore	 the	 hypothesis	 that	 parties	 fearful	 of	 the	 electoral	 costs	 of	
participating	in	a	coalition	can	be	compensated	by	a	disproportionate	allocation	of	various	policy	
and	office	payoffs	during	coalition	bargaining.	
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Appendix:	Survey	Question	on	the	Distribution	of	Cabinet	Seats	
	
Two	political	parties	are	negotiating	to	form	a	coalition	government.	Between	them,	they	have	
100	seats	in	Dáil	Éireann.	Party	A	has	80	TDs	and	Party	B	has	20	TDs.		
The	cabinet	is	to	comprise	10	ministers.			
How	many	cabinet	seats	should	Party	B	receive?	
		Party	B	should	receive	1	cabinet	seat	
		Party	B	should	receive	2	cabinet	seats	
		Party	B	should	receive	3	cabinet	seats	
		Party	B	should	receive	4	cabinet	seats	
		Party	B	should	receive	5	cabinet	seats	
		Party	B	should	receive	6	cabinet	seats	
		Party	B	should	receive	7	cabinet	seats	
		Party	B	should	receive	8	cabinet	seats	
		Party	B	should	receive	9	cabinet	seats	
	
Treatment	Group	A	Vignette	
If	Party	B	enters	the	coalition,	it	can	expect	significant	losses	at	the	next	general	election,	
resulting	in	5	of	the	20	TDs	from	Party	B	losing	their	seat.	Party	A,	in	contrast,	will	lose	no	or	few	
seats.		
	
Treatment	Group	B	Vignette	
If	Party	B	enters	the	coalition,	it	can	expect	significant	losses	at	the	next	general	election,	
resulting	in	10	TDs	from	Party	B	losing	their	seat.	Party	A,	in	contrast,	will	lose	no	or	few	seats.		
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